UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-18-2011

State v. Wright Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38017

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Wright Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38017" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3052.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3052

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

vs.
TIMOTHY EUGENE WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.

IDJ:~HU

COpy

NO. 38017

)
)
)
)
)
)

----------------~--------)
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SPENCER J. HAHN
State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF·RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
I.

II.

Wright Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered That Wright
Appear For At Least A Short While In Restraints After
Wright Became Combative And Threatening To Court
Security Personnel .......................... '" ....................................... .4
A.

Introduction ......................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review ......................................................... 5

C.

Wright Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of
Discretion In Relation To Ordering The Use
Of Restraints ....................................................................6
1.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental
Error In The Lack Of A Hearing ............................. 7

2.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental
Error From The Court Telling The Jury About
The Restraints ....................................................... 9

3.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental
Error By The Alleged Failure To Use The
Least Visible Means Of Restraint.. ...................... 11

Wright Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct
For Using Evidence Of Wright's Attempts To Obstruct
The Investigation As Evidence Of Consciousness Of
Guilt .......................................................................................... 12

III.

IV.

A.

Introduction .................................................................... 12

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 13

C.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
In The Prosecution's Use Of Evidence That Wright
Attempted To Obstruct The Investigation ...................... 13
1.

Wright Has Shown No Constitutional Error ......... 14

2.

Wright Has Shown No Clear Error ...................... 17

3.

Wright Has Shown No Prejudice ......................... 19

Wright Has Failed To Show That Evidence He Had
Entered A Bank And Behaved Suspiciously The Day
Before The Robbery Was Irrelevant ......................................... 20
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 20

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 21

C.

The Evidence Was Relevant.. ........................................ 21

Wright Has Failed To Show That There Was More Than
One Preserved Error To Cumulate ........................................... 21

CONCLUSiON ...............................................................................................22
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ......................................................................... 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) ............................................................... 16
Commonwealth v. Billings, 676 N.E.2d 62 (Mass. App. 1997) ..................... 15,16
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) ................................................................ 15
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) .................................................. 5, 6, 10, 11
Greerv. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) ................................................................... 17
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) ........................................................ 6,10, 11
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 937 P.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997) ......................... 22
Statev. Alford, 47 Idaho 162,272 P. 1010 (1928) ............................................. 21
State v. Bates, 495 A.2d 422 (N.J. App. 1985) ................................................... 15
Statev. Betancourt, 2011 WL3305382 (Idaho App., Aug. 3,2011) ................... 17
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000) .............................. 13
State v. Coleman, 593 P.2d 684 (Az. App. 1978) ......................................... 15, 16
State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87,577 P.2d 1135 (1978) .................................... 7,8
State v. Curry, 103 Idaho 332, 647 P .2d 788 (Ct. App. 1982) ................ 14, 16, 17
Statev. Gomez, 1371daho671, 52 P.3d 315 (2002) ......................................... 21
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998) ......................... 22
State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989) ......................... 21
State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 898 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1995) .................... 6,10,11
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,233 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2010) ....................... 13
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1992} ...................... 7, 8
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,872 P.2d 708 (1994) ..................................... 21

iii

State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 955 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1998) ...................... 10, 11
State v. Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 491 P.2d 858 (1971)"' ............................................. 8
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ................................... passim
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 253 P.3d 754 (Ct. App. 2011) ............................... 21
State v. Selvidge, 635 P.2d 736 (Wash App., Div. 2,1981) ......................... 15,16
State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 767 P .2d 832 (Ct. App. 1989) ........................ 13
State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2010) ...................... 21
Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664

(ih Cir.

2010) ........................................... 11

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) ...................................................... 17
United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985 (3 rd Cir. 1985) ............................................ 15

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-108 ...................................................................................................... 11

RULES
I.R.E. 401 ........................................................................................................... 21
I.R.E. 402 ........................................................................................................... 21

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Timothy Eugene Wright appeals from his judgment of conviction for
robbery.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Two men armed with handguns robbed the Cash Store, a loan business in
Idaho Falls, by entering, threatening the two employees, and taking about $2,700
in cash. (Trial Tr., p. 15, L. 1 - p. 30, L. 15; p. 35, L. 22 - p. 43, L. 12; p. 162, L.
8 - p. 168, L. 8.) The state charged Wright with robbery for that incident and also
alleged a firearm enhancement.

(R., pp. 22-23.)

The enhancement was

dismissed upon the state's motion. (R., pp. 41,47.)
The case proceeded to jury trial, where the primary issue was identity,
after which the jury convicted Wright as charged. (R., pp. 57-70, 72-81, 84-87;
see generally Trial Tr.; see also 6/10/10 Tr., p. 92, L. 20 - p. 111, L. 25.) The
evidence that indicated Wright was the robber included:

he was of the same

general height, stature and race as the robbers and had a similar voice (Trial Tr.,
p. 27, Ls. 9-18; p. 29, Ls. 21-25; p. 177, L. 22 - p. 178, L. 24); one of the victims
had positively identified Kenneth Wright, Wright's brother and another passenger
in the car in which Wright was stopped shortly after the robbery, as the other
robber (Trial Tr., p. 168, L. 9 - p. 170, L. 14; p. 208, L. 8 - p. 210, L. 14); both
Wright brothers possessed shoes matching the footprints left at or near the
robbery (Trial Tr., p.123, L.15-p.145, L.14; p.146, L.15-p.151, L.12);
Wright and his associates were in possession of bills in numbers and
1

denominations closely matching the money stolen in the robbery (Trial Tr., p.
275, L. 21 - p. 276, L. 8; p. 326, L. 24 - p. 327, L. 12; p. 359, L. 12 - p. 366, L.
12); ski masks consistent with those worn by the robbers were found in the car in
which Wright was a passenger (Trial Tr., p. 95, Ls. 8-15; p. 175, Ls. 15-21; p.
272, Ls. 1-8; p. 342, L. 3 - p. 343, L. 6); the car in which Wright was later
stopped was seen fleeing near the scene of the robbery shortly after the robbery
(Trial Tr., p. 72, L.7 - p. 80, L. 13); Wright lied to police about his whereabouts
and activities at the time of the crime and even about his shoe size (Trial Tr., p.
267, L. 3 -

p. 268, L. 1; p. 332, Ls. 11-22); Wright was present (and

photographed) at businesses near the scene of the robbery shortly before the
robbery (Trial Tr., p. 293, L. 13 - p. 299, L. 21; p. 301, L. 25 - p. 320, L. 11; p.
327, L. 13 - p. 332, L. 10; p. 333, L. 3 - p. 341, L. 6); Wright tried to conceal the
money in his physical possession (Trial Tr., p. 216, L. 25 - p. 219, L. 7); and
photographs taken near the time and place of the robbery showed Wright
wearing a hoody jacket identical to one worn by one of the robbers (Trial Tr., p.
255, L. 25 - p. 256, L. 22; p. 259, L. 18 - p. 263, L. 4; p. 276, L. 9 - p. 278, L. 2;
p. 333, L. 3-p. 341, L. 6).
The district court entered judgment, sentencing Wright to life with fifteen
years determinate. (R., pp. 98-99.) Wright filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp. 102-06.)
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ISSUES
Wright states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Wright's due process rights
to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence when it
placed him in restraints and informed the jury that he was so
restrained?

2.

Was Mr. Wright deprived of his constitutional rights to due
process and a fair trial when the prosecutor elicited
testimony that Mr. Wright invoked his Fourth Amendment
right and referred to that fact in opening statements and
closing arguments?

3.

Did the district court err when it permitted the State to offer
irrelevant prior bad acts evidence over Mr. Wright's
objection?

4.

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Wright's right
to a fair trial denied as a result of the accumulation of serious
errors throughout his trial?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Wright failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when
it ordered that Wright appear for at least a short while in restraints after
Wright became combative and threatening to court security personnel?

2.

Has Wright failed to show prosecutorial misconduct for using evidence of
Wright's attempts to obstruct the investigation as evidence of
consciousness of guilt?

3.

Has Wright failed to show that evidence he had entered a bank and
behaved suspiciously the day before the robbery was irrelevant?

4.

Has Wright failed to show that there was more than one preserved error to
cumulate?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
Wright Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Ordered That Wright Appear For At Least A Short While In Restraints After
Wright Became Combative And Threatening To Court Security Personnel
A.

Introduction
During the second day of trial, just after the first witness had been cross-

examined by his counsel, Wright interrupted the judge in order to try to make a
statement. (Trial Tr., p. 48, Ls. 11-12.) The judge told Wright he "may not" make
a statement. (Trial Tr., p. 48, L. 13.) Very shortly thereafter, and immediately
after the next witness had been sworn but before he could testify, the court
spontaneously ordered an unscheduled recess for defense counsel to consult
with the defendant.

(Trial Tr., p. 48, L. 25 - p. 49, L. 2.)

Upon reconvening

outside the presence of the jury the court put on the record that the marshal had
informed it that "Mr. Wright has become combative and threatening to the
Marshal and I have authorized, as a result of that, that he be restrained and
continue to be restrained until further order." (Trial Tr., p. 49, Ls. 12-18.) Neither
Wright nor his counsel disputed the marshal's report. (ld.)
The court the'n granted Wright's motion to proceed without counsel. (Trial
Tr., p. 49, L. 18 - p. 55, L. 12.) During that colloquy the court made sure Wright
was aware that if he was disruptive he could be removed from the courtroom or
gagged and that if that happened he would be left without representation in the
courtroom. (Trial Tr., p. 52, L. 20 - p. 53, L. 12.)
Before the jury was brought in Wright asked for removal of the restraints,
but the court declined, referencing an incident "downstairs" and stating that it was
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not going to have Wright "threatening the Marshals." (Trial Tr., p. 57, Ls. 7-13.)
Again Wright did not dispute that there had been an incident or that he had
threatened the marshals. (Id.) Once the jury was in place the court informed it
that Wright had elected to represent himself and that there had been a "little fuss"
and the court had ordered that "Mr. Wright be restrained," but that he would
"loosen that up" if Wright "behaves himself here." (Trial Tr., p. 57, L. 22 - p. 58,
L. 7.) The record does not indicate whether the restraints were either removed or

in place at any other point of the trial. (See generally Trial Tr.; R., pp. 57-70, 7281.)
Wright does not claim that using restraints because he threatened a
marshal was an abuse of discretion. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp. 6-12.)
Rather, he argues on appeal that the district court erred because it (1) ordered
restraints to be used "without an evidentiary hearing," (2) informed the jury of the
restraints, and (3) "failed to use the least restrictive and visible restraints
available." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Application of the relevant law shows that
Wright has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The determination of whether to restrain a defendant at trial is

discretionary.

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005).

A discretionary

decision will be reversed on appeal only where there is a showing by the
appellant of an abuse of discretion. See, SUL., State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
_ , 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (abuse of discretion standard applied to challenge
to admission of evidence).
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C.

Wright Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In Relation To
Ordering The Use Of Restraints
"[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical

restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of
its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular triaL"
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). "We believe trial judges confronted
with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given
sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case." Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).

"The use of any restraint must be based upon a

finding of the necessity for that restraint." State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 147,
898 P.2d 71,78 (Ct. App. 1995).
Here the district court ordered restraints based on the finding that Wright
had become combative and threatened the marshals. (Trial Tr., p. 49, Ls. 14-18;
p. 57, Ls. 9-13.) On appeal Wright does not argue that his actions of becoming
combative and threatening the marshals were insufficient grounds for the court's
exercise of discretion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-12.) Instead, Wright argues on
appeal that the district court erred by not holding a hearing (Appellant's brief, pp.
8-10); by informing the jury of the restraints (Appellant's brief, p. 10); and by not
using the "least visible restraint possible" (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12). None of
these issues were preserved at trial, however.
The appellate court will address an issue raised for the first time on appeal
only if the appellant shows fundamental error.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,

_ , 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To demonstrate fundamental error the appellant
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must show that the alleged error "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."

kL at _ , 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this standard in this case shows
Wright has failed to demonstrate fundamental error.

1.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Lack Of A
Hearing

Depriving the defense of an opportunity to challenge the need for
restraints prior to the defendant's appearance before the jury in restraints can
violate due process:
We hold, therefore, that under the circumstances of this
case, where the district court had originally ordered that the
defendant stand trial without physical restraints, but then rescinded
the order based upon information obtained in a hearing which
neither the defendant nor his counsel were advised of or attended,
where neither the defendant nor his attorney had any opportunity to
contest the order or suggest a less visible means of restraint before
the defendant was first exposed to the jury, and where timely
objection to the restraints was made, the defendant's rights to a fair
trial and to appear and defend in person and with counsel
guaranteed by the due process clauses ... were violated, and he is
entitled to a new trial.
State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 98, 577 P.2d 1135, 1146 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, if "counsel for the accused desires to object
to the defendant being brought before the court in leg restraints, he or she should
do so before the jurors arrive or after requesting a hearing outside the presence
of the jury." State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 105, 822 P.2d 998, 1002 (Ct. App.
1992).

7

In this case the marshal informed the court that Wright had become
combative and was threatening the marshal. (Trial Tr., p. 49, Ls. 14-16.) A court
may rely upon such representations.

State v. Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 479, 491

P.2d 858, 860 (1971) ("In exercising its discretion, the judge need not rely only
upon evidence formally offered and admitted at trial.

His knowledge may

properly stem from official records or what law enforcement officers have told
him."). The district court informed Wright in court before the jury entered that this
was the ground for ordering Wright restrained during the proceedings. (Trial Tr.,
p. 49, Ls. 12-18.) Neither Wright nor his soon-to-be-discharged counsel objected
or challenged the marshal's version of events. (Trial Tr., p. 49, L. 12 - p. 57, L.
13.) Wright did not dispute the marshal's representations or request a hearing to
present additional evidence despite the opportunity to do so. He must therefore
demonstrate on appeal fundamental error from the lack of a formal hearing.
Wright has failed to show constitutional error, the first prong of the
fundamental error standard. Indeed, he has failed to show error at all. It is the
defendant's burden to object prior to being seen by the jury. Knutson, 121 Idaho
at 105, 822 P.2d at 1002. Only if the district court acted in a way to deprive
Wright of the ability to make a timely objection is there constitutional error.
Crawford, 99 Idaho at 98, 577 P.2d at 1146.

Here the court provided ample

opportunity for Wright to challenge the evidence that he had been combative and
threatening. Wright has shown no constitutional error in the lack of a hearing.
Wright has also failed to show error that can be considered clear on the
record. Wright was made aware of the district court's determination that he had
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been combative and threatening and the source of the court's information to that
effect. Yet Wright did not deny that he had been combative or threatening or
otherwise challenge that finding of fact. There is nothing in the record suggesting
that Wright disagreed with the court's finding that he had been combative and
threatening or that he had any evidence to present that would show he had not
been combative and threatening. There is a perfectly logical explanation for why
Wright did not object: he knew he had been combative and threatening.
Finally, Wright bears the burden of showing prejudice. The record here
suggests that Wright did not dispute the fact that he had been combative and
threatening. The record certainly shows no contrary evidence. Lack of a formal
hearing on this apparently uncontested fact did not prejudice Wright.

2.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error From The Court
Telling The Jury About The Restraints

After returning from the break the court stated to the jury that there were
two changes during the break-the discharge of defense counsel and the use of
restraints. (Trial Tr., p. 57, L. 17 - p. 58, L. 8.) The court informed the jury of the
reason for the change in restraint. (Id.) There was no objection or motion for a
mistrial at that (id.), or any other, time. Wright apparently claims that the court
could have avoided any prejudice to him by not speaking about the restraints.
He has failed to demonstrate how informing the jury of the restraints constituted
fundamental error.
First, Wright has shown no constitutional violation.

It is "axiomatic" that

the use of restraints cannot violate due process if the use of restraints was
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unknown to the jury. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 293, 955 P.2d 603, 608 (Ct.
App. 1998) (factual finding that jurors did not see restraints foreclosed due
process violation claim).

As set forth above, a defendant may be visibly

restrained if the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds sufficient grounds to
do so. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
343 (1970); State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140,147,898 P.2d 71,78 (Ct. App. 1995).
The jury being aware of the restraints is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for finding a due process violation. Because the district court properly
exercised its discretion to restrain him, Wright has failed to show any due
process violation arising merely from the fact that the jury was aware of the
restraints.
Nor is the error clear on the record. The record does not indicate that the
jury was or would have remained unaware of the restraints. To the contrary, the
district court informed the jury informed the jury of the reason for the restrains "so
there's no question as far as what's going on" (Trial Tr., p. 58, Ls. 3-6), strongly
indicating that the district court was aware that the jury would see the restraints.
Thus, there is nothing clear in the record that the court could have avoided any
potential prejudice arising from the use of restraints by merely not commenting
on them.
Finally, Wright has shown no prejudice from the court's comments.
Because the record does not support the inference that the jury would have
remained ignorant of the restraints but for the court's comments, Wright's claims
of prejudice are entirely speculative.
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3.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error By The Alleged
Failure To Use The Least Visible Means Of Restraint

Corollary to the rule that due process is not implicated if the jury is
unaware of the restraints, some courts have held that a court ordering restraints
that cannot be completely concealed from the jury must still use the "least visible"
restraints necessary to secure the defendant to avoid undue prejudice.
Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664, 668-69

(ih

Cir. 2010) (and cases cited)

(cited at Appellant's brief, p. 11.) A similar rule has been adopted in Idaho by
statute prohibiting "any more restraint than is necessary." I.C. § 19-108; State v.
Miller, 131 Idaho 288,293,955 P.2d 603,608 (Ct. App. 1998). Because Wright
did not at trial object that his restraint was more than necessary or show that less
visible restraints could have been used, he has the burden of showing
fundamental error on appeal.
There is no fundamental error because Wright has failed to show
constitutional error, the first prong of the fundamental error test.

As set forth

above, a defendant may be visibly restrained if the court, in the exercise of its
discretion, finds sufficient grounds to do so. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629
(2005); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140,
147, 898 P.2d 71, 78 (Ct. App. 1995).

Indeed, such restraint may extend to

gagging the defendant. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 (defendant can be shackled and
gagged "as a last resort"). Wright has failed to show that the restraints used
were so prejudicial in relation to the risk he presented as to be an abuse of the
trial court's discretion.
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The error is not clear on the record. Nowhere in the record are the types
of restraints used made clear. It is possible we are dealing with handcuffs, leg
restraints, a shock belt, or even a belly chain. We simply do not know because
Wright never asserted the claim that less visible restraints should be employed.
Wright has failed to show on the record a clear abuse of discretion.
Finally, because Wright has failed to show that a less visible restraint was
even possible, he has failed to show prejudice.

Wright has failed to show

fundamental error by his claim that the district court should have used a less
visible restraint.

II.
Wright Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct For Using Evidence Of
Wright's Attempts To Obstruct The Investigation As Evidence Of Consciousness
Of Guilt
A.

Introduction
During the trial the prosecutor used evidence of Wright's attempts to

obstruct the investigation, including not cooperating with efforts to photograph the
soles of his shoes, hiding money, and lying in his interview, as evidence of
consciousness of guilt. (7/7/10 Tr., p. 23, L. 5 - p. 24, L. 23; Trial Tr., p. 99, L. 8
-po 100, L. 24; p.111, L. 19-p.112, L. 9; p. 210, L. 24-p. 212, L. 23; p. 216,
L. 8 - p. 219, L. 15; p. 234, L. 11 - p. 235 L. 4; p. 251, L. 20 - p. 272, L. 17;
7/10/10 Tr., p. 105, L. 23 - p. 106, L. 7; p. 107, L. 19 - p. 108, L. 3; State's
Exhibits 6, 7, 56.) For the first time on appeal Wright invokes the fundamental
error rule and claims that his efforts at obstructing the investigation in relation to
the photographing of the soles of his shoes were actually attempts to invoke his
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Fourth Amendment rights.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-21.)

Wright's claim of

fundamental error does not withstand analysis.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho
457,459,767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

Wright Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecution's Use
Of Evidence That Wright Attempted To Obstruct The Investigation
Wright concedes that this appellate claim of error is unpreserved by timely

objection to the trial court. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) An unpreserved issue may
only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error."
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).

State v.
In the

absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2)
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the
13

error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings."

19.:. at _ ,

245 P.3d at 978. Review shows that Wright has failed

to show any of the three prongs necessary to prevail on his claim of fundamental
error.

1.

Wright Has Shown No Constitutional Error

Wright has failed to show that he was asserting a constitutional right by
resisting efforts by police to view the bottoms of his shoes. 1 In State v. Curry,
103 Idaho 332, 334-35, 647 P.2d 788, 790-91 (Ct. App. 1982), officers stopped
Curry and his companions on suspicion of burglary. They "asked Curry to hold
his foot up so the officers could look at the sole of his shoe."

19.:. at 338,

647 P.2d

788, 794. In addressing Curry's claim that this constituted a search the Idaho
Court of Appeals applied the expectation of privacy test of the Fourth
Amendment, compared looking at the sole of the shoe to obtaining a handwriting
or voice exemplar, in which there are no privacy rights, and held that "Curry did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the physical
characteristics of the soles of his shoes."

kl

The holding of the Idaho Court of Appeals that there is no privacy concern
arising from a viewing of the bottom of a shoe in the course of a proper
investigative stop is consistent with the holdings of other courts that have

Wright does not assert that introduction of evidence of resistance to lawful
police actions based upon a mistaken belief that such actions are unlawful raises
due process concerns. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-21.) The state therefore does
not address that issue in this brief.
1
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considered the question. There is no privacy expectation in the pattern of one's
shoes, which are "shown to the world with every footstep." State v. Selvidge, 635
P.2d 736, 740 (Wash App., Div. 2, 1981). "The soles of a person's shoes, and
especially the pattern on the soles of a person's shoes, are constantly exposed
for public view, such as when we kneel to pray, when we lift our feet to walk or
run, when we cross our legs or prop them up on a table or chair, when we
remove our shoes and leave them lying idly on the floor, or as in this case, when
we leave footprints in the mud or dirt." State v. Bates, 495 A.2d 422, 427 (N.J.
App. 1985). Like a voice exemplar, examination of the physical characteristics of
the soles of a suspect's shoes "involves none of the probing into an individual's
private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search."

State v.

Coleman, 593 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Az. App. 1978), approved in relevant part 593
P.2d 653 (Az. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The physical characteristics of the soles of a person's shoes,
like one's voice, face, and handwriting, are constantly exposed to
the public. Footprints on the ground are visible for all to see.
People display the soles of their shoes when they cross their legs,
climb stairs, or put their feet up on furniture. Viewing the soles of a
person's shoes does not "constitute [ ] the type of 'severe, though
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security' that is subject to
constitutional scrutiny .... "
Commonwealth v. Billings, 676 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Mass. App. 1997) (brackets
original) (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)).
In addition, compelling a defendant to provide ink printing of his shoes and
feet as part of a grand jury investigation has been held to be like fingerprinting
and therefore not an intrusion into privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 994-96 (3 rd Cir. 1985). Indeed, Wright cites
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to no court that has found a privacy expectation in the pattern on the soles of
one's shoes such that requiring a suspect to show it to officers constitutes a
search. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-21.)
Wright first argues that the analysis in Curry-that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the soles of the shoes-is dicta. (Appellant's brief, pp.
16-17.) Although the holding of the case was that the seizure of Curry's shoes
without a warrant was proper upon his arrest based on probable cause, that
holding was based on the analysis that the evidence leading to probable cause to
arrest (matching footprints to Curry's shoes) was not obtained by an improper
search. Curry, 103 Idaho at 338, 647 P.2d at 794. That Curry had no privacy
interest infringed by looking at the soles of his shoes was thus central to the
court's holding that the seizure of the known relevant evidence (the shoes) was
lawful, not mere dicta.
Even if the analysis in Curry could be characterized as dicta the analysis
is still correct: Wright had no reasonable expectation of privacy infringed by
photographing the soles of his shoes. Curry, 103 Idaho at 338, 647 P.2d at 794;
Ferri, 778 F.2d at 994-96; Coleman, 593 P.2d at 686-87; Billings, 676 N.E.2d at
65; Bates, 495 A.2d at 427; Selvidge, 635 P.2d at 740. Wright argues that the
"logic" of these cases has been "overruled" by precedent of the Supreme Court of
the United States. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18.) He asserts that in Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), where the Court stated that moving stereo
equipment in the defendant's house to find serial numbers constituted a search,
the "Supreme Court[] reject[ed] the idea that a de minimis search is of no
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constitutional significance." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) The flaw in this argument
is that nowhere in Curry is the concept of a de minimis search even mentioned.
Rather, the case was decided on the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy,
Curry, 103 Idaho at 338, 647 P.2d at 794 ("Curry did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the physical characteristics of the soles of
his shoes."); a concept, to undersigned's knowledge, that has not been overruled
by the Supreme Court.
If Wright had left fingerprints instead of shoe prints at the scene of the
crime, there is little doubt that taking his fingerprints for comparison would not
have been a search.

See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973)

(requiring the provision of a voice exemplar, like fingerprinting, is not a search).
That he left shoe prints instead is not of constitutional significance.

Taking a

photograph of the bottom of his shoe, like inking his fingers and taking
impressions, did not intrude on his reasonable expectation of privacy and was
therefore not a search. Wright's claim of fundamental error fails.

2.

Wright Has Shown No Clear Error

Wright's claim of fundamental error fails on the second prong of the test
because the error is not plain on the record. It is improper for a prosecutor to
request a jury to infer guilt from the invocation of a constitutional right. Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65 (1987) (mere reference to silence not enough; state
must use evidence to create inference of guilt).

Thus, it is improper for a

prosecutor to comment on "a defendant's refusal to consent to a search." State
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v. Betancourt, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d _,2011 WL 3305382, *5 (Idaho App.,

Aug. 3,2011). Wright has failed to show plain error for two reasons.
First, as noted above, Wright had no right to refuse the photographing or
other observation of the physical characteristics of his shoes.

Wright has not

argued, much less presented authority, suggesting that a prosecutor may not talk
about resistance to lawful police efforts to gather evidence.

Because it is not

clear from the record that any reference to any legitimate effort to invoke any
actual constitutional right is involved in this case, Wright has failed to show clear
error.
Second, the error is not clear on the record because the evidence does
not show that Wright was in fact attempting to assert any Fourth Amendment
right. At the scene of the stop Wright "voiced some concerns that I was violating
his rights [by photographing his shoes], picking on him because he is a black

man and that I was fishing because we hadn't found anything at that point."
(Trial Tr., p. 100, Ls. 9-13 (emphasis added).)

Another officer testified that

Wright at one point stated he was not going to give permission to photograph the
shoes, but that statement was apparently not in response to a request for a
consent search but was instead in the face of officer insistence that he allow the
shoes to be photographed. (Trial Tr., p. 212, Ls. 17-20.) A third officer, called by
the defense, testified that Wright refused to cooperate with photographing his
shoes unless the photographing was witnessed by his brother. (Trial Tr., p. 387,
L. 13 - p. 389, L. 23.) The record suggests that, rather than asserting a Fourth

Amendment right, Wright was refusing to cooperate with the officers' lawful
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insistence that his shoes be photographed by claiming that the officers' attempt
to look at the soles of his shoes was racial harassment and insisting that his
brother witness the police investigation.
Wright's appellate argument that the prosecution was trying to get the jury
to infer guilt from the exercise of a Fourth Amendment right is not supported by
the record.

On the contrary, the record appears to support the inference that

Wright was simply resisting the lawful directives of the police for reasons
unrelated to any assertion of Fourth Amendment rights.

3.

Wright Has Shown No Prejudice

The entirety of Wright's prejudice argument is to note that the prosecutor
acknowledged

that the

evidence

of Wright's

guilt was

circumstantial. 2

(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21.) Wright cannot prevail on this argument; his claim
that any error is automatically prejudicial when the evidence is circumstantial is
meritless.

The evidence circumstantially showing Wright's guilt discussed by the
prosecutor included evidence that one of the victims had positively identified
Kenneth Wright as the other robber; both Wright brothers possessed shoes
matching the footprints left at or near the robbery; Wright and his associates
were in possession of bills in numbers and denominations closely matching the
money stolen in the robbery; ski masks consistent with those worn by the robbers
were found in the car in which Wright was a passenger; Wright generally
matched the description of the robber (whose face was concealed by a ski
mask); the presence of the car Wright was later stopped in being near the scene
of the robbery shortly after the robbery; Wright lying about his whereabouts and
activities at the time of the crime; Wright being present (and photographed) at
businesses near the scene of the robbery shortly before the robbery; Wright
trying to conceal the money in his possession; and the robber wore a hoody
identical to one found in the car and worn by Wright in the photographs near the
time of the robbery. (7/10/10 Tr., p. 101, L. 12 - p. 111, L. 25.)
2
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III.
Wright Has Failed To Show That Evidence He Had Entered A Bank And
Behaved Suspiciously The Day Before The Robbery Was Irrelevant
A.

Introduction
During the trial the state presented evidence of the activities of Wright and

his associates-Wright's brother, Kenneth, and Roosevelt Hogg-on the day
before and the day of the robbery. Specifically, the state presented evidence that
the three men had twice entered the Bank of America down the street from the
robbery site with no apparent business the day before the robbery (Trial Tr., p.
301, L. 23 - p. 320, L. 11; p. 333, L. 3 - p. 343, L. 8; State's Exhibits 59, 60, 70,
71, 74); and entered the Albertsons across the street from the robbery site the
morning of the robbery (Trial Tr., p. 293, L. 13 - p. 299, L. 21; p. 327, L. 13 - p.
333, L. 2; State's Exhibit 58b). Wright objected to evidence about his presence
in the bank on the grounds it was irrelevant. (Trial Tr., p. 305, Ls. 19-24; p. 313,
Ls. 2-3; p. 315, Ls. 12-13.) The district court overruled the objections. (Trial Tr.,
p. 305, L. 25 - p. 306, L. 10; p. 313, Ls. 4-15; p. 315, Ls. 14-15.)
On appeal Wright argues that evidence he "behaved suspiciously in a
bank" is not "relevant to the question of whether Mr. Wright robbed the Cash
Store, and should not have been admitted." (Appellant's brief, p. 23.) On the
contrary, evidence that Wright, wearing clothing associated with the robber of the
Cash Store, was with his known associates scouting out a bank near the Cash
Store for a robbery the day before the robbery of the Cash Store is relevant
evidence.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho

671, 674, 52 P.3d 315,318 (2002); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d
754, 760 (Ct. App. 2011).

C.

The Evidence Was Relevant
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho
544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). '''Evidence of a plan or design or scheme is
relevant, if it tends by reasonable inference to establish the commission of the
crime charged.'" State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 721, 249 P.3d 1169, 1176 (Ct.
App. 2010) (quoting State v. Alford, 47 Idaho 162, 174, 272 P. 1010, 1013
(1928)). Evidence that Wright was out with his associates looking for a place to
rob, the day before the charged robbery, in the vicinity of the robbery, while
dressed in clothes later worn by the robbers, is undoubtedly relevant. 3

IV.
Wright Has Failed To Show That There Was More Than One Preserved Error To
Cumulate
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

The state also asserts that any error in admitting irrelevant evidence is harmless
in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt as set forth in the Statement of the
Facts and Course of the Proceedings, above.

3
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Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Cumulative error
analysis does not, however, include errors neither objected to nor found
fundamental.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 220, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).

Wright has failed to show any error, much less two or more preserved errors.
Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case.

See,~,

LaBellev. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Wright's conviction for
robbery.

DATED this 18th day of November, 2011.

K NNETH K. JOR
Deputy Attorney G
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